

**SCOTLAND'S  
AVIAN INFLUENZA AND NEWCASTLE DISEASE  
CONTINGENCY PLAN**

Scottish Executive  
January 2006

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## FOREWORD

1. This Scottish Contingency Plan is for use in the event of an outbreak of High Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) or Newcastle Disease (ND). The two diseases are treated together as they are both viral diseases of birds, showing a similar epidemiology. The Plan is primarily intended for use in an outbreak of disease in farmed poultry rather than in wild birds. It is written in such a way as to be capable of dealing with a major disease outbreak which could be spread widely across Scotland, or equally a more limited outbreak.

2. Measures to control HPAI and ND are set out in Directives 92/40/EEC and 92/66/EEC respectively. These are implemented in domestic legislation by the Diseases of Poultry (Scotland) Order 2003. The EU requires that an initial stamping out policy be undertaken to control these diseases. This requirement has a significant impact on the contents of the Plan.

3. The Plan sets out the over-arching framework which the Scottish Executive will put into place, which maximises flexibility and can be adjusted to take account of the scale of any HPAI or ND outbreak and other circumstances that are specific to the control and eradication of the disease. The Plan allows the Executive to respond immediately to all aspects of a disease situation and identifies the key policy and operational responses which are likely to be introduced as a consequence of a major disease outbreak.

4. The Plan is about process and structure which is similar to that detailed in the Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Scottish Contingency Plan (revised May 2004), and recognises the complex nature of infectious disease and the need for different control measures.

5. Recognising that high standards of biosecurity are already maintained by all **major** poultry organisations the Plan looks to provide general biosecurity guidance for **all** poultry keepers.

### Context

6. The commitments in this Plan recognise the serious effects animal diseases such as HPAI or ND can have on animal welfare and the effect animal health has on industry viability, particularly given the continuous, rather than seasonal output, of the poultry sector. The Plan highlights how the wider impact of a disease outbreak will be taken into consideration and contribute to the strategic decision making process. However, the focus of the Plan is on the control and eradication of disease and as such the wider issues are not covered in any great depth.

7. This Plan is a “living document” and is subject to regular and ongoing review by the Executive, with input from industry and other stakeholders. Exercises are undertaken to test the effectiveness of contingency plans in a disease outbreak. Many of the principles of the response to a HPAI or ND outbreak will be characteristic of the response to other exotic disease outbreaks. Opportunities for learning and training will be taken through a regular programme of rehearsals across a number of exotic diseases.

## **Legislative Basis**

8. The legislative basis under which Scottish Ministers will act is, predominantly, the Diseases of Poultry (Scotland) Order 2003 (Statutory Instrument 2003 No. 354), as read with the Animal Health Act 1981. A key requirement in the event of the first case of confirmed disease will be the introduction of the Protection and Surveillance Zone measures (also referred to as the Infected Area measures) e.g. culling out of infected premises, movement controls and the enforcement of stringent biosecurity. These measures will cover an area with a minimum 10 km radius surrounding the Infected Premises. Any premises in or partly in the Infected Area would be deemed to be wholly within that area. The exact boundaries of the Infected Area would be placed on the SEERAD website so that anyone could check the precise area details.

## **Part of GB response**

9. The Plan is specific to Scotland, reflecting the fact that animal health matters are devolved to the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive, with Scotland's Minister for Environment and Rural Development leading any Scottish response. However, recognising that GB is a single epidemiological unit, that there is a single GB SVS and that there needs to be strong co-ordination and co-operation in responding to contagious diseases, the Plan dovetails with the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)'s Generic Contingency Plan<sup>1</sup>. This linkage is important to facilitate prompt communication and co-ordination in any disease situation. It also offers scope for exploiting the potential economies of scale in the use of some resources.

10. The DEFRA Generic Exotic Diseases Contingency Plan includes an Annex for AI/ND procedures. The Plan is based around three levels of command structure – Strategic, Tactical and Operational, that would be deployed in England, although the structures would in the main apply for any outbreak in Scotland or Wales. The Welsh approach is broadly similar to DEFRA's. A Welsh Co-ordination Centre (WCC) would provide strategic support and the Welsh Assembly Government would be responsible for any legislation required in Wales.

11. This Plan provides a disease control framework specific to the Scottish situation. The key differences from the DEFRA and Welsh plans are in the command and control framework, and the links into the Local Plans which exist for each of Scotland's five Animal Health Divisions<sup>2</sup>.

## **GB co-ordination**

12. In the event of an outbreak a National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) would be set up by the SVS Agency to co-ordinate GB disease control operations. This Centre would provide logistical support to the disease response across GB. Liaison Officers from Scotland will be based at the NDCC to be involved in overall management of GB operations, and to ensure that there is strong communication back to and from the Disease Strategy Group (DSG) and Local Disease Control Centres (LDCCs) in Scotland.

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.defra.gov.uk/footandmouth/pdf/genericcp-final.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/about/ERADRA/LAH/00015721/AHOMAP.aspx>

13. It will be important to draw in scientific expertise to inform the disease control response. This will involve epidemiological modelling and analysis to give a scientific basis to advice and recommendations on disease control. Such work is best taken forward on a GB basis given the size of the field of relevant specialists and the need to avoid duplication of effort. Although this will be considered on a GB basis, arrangements are in place to ensure that the Executive will receive appropriate advice, particularly on Scottish specific issues.

14. Given the need for close co-ordination and the specific requirements of accountability to their own Parliament, there will be dialogue between Animal Health and Welfare Ministers and the officials leading the response in their administration. The Devolved Administrations would also be represented at meetings of the Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC) helping to ensure strategic co-ordination at a high level, particularly in terms of consequence management.

### **Internal Executive co-ordination**

15. The Scottish Executive is responsible for co-ordinating the civil emergency response in Scotland. In a major emergency, the Scottish Executive activates central co-ordination arrangements to ensure an integrated response from all SE departments and other agencies. In Scotland the Ministerial Group on Civil Contingencies (MGCC) will, on behalf of the Scottish Cabinet, take the Ministerial lead and set the overall parameters of any response. Animal disease differs from most other contingencies in that the Executive, particularly through the SVS, are responsible for the operational and policy response as well as impact management. It is expected that the group would be chaired by the Minister for Environment and Rural Development.

16. The Disease Strategy Group (DSG) will inform the MGCC and will co-ordinate and manage the Scottish disease control response. It will be supported and briefed by the Scottish Executive Emergency Action Team (EAT) - a team of senior Scottish Executive officials who will facilitate implementation of decisions taken by the DSG and ensure co-ordination of Scottish Executive activity. They will ensure that in a disease outbreak each Scottish Executive Department mobilises the necessary resources and that activities of each department are co-ordinated to support SEERAD as the lead department. The Team also plays an important role in ensuring that each area of the Executive's interests are accounted for when decisions on the emergency response are being made. A Scottish Executive Emergency Support Team will support the EAT by gathering, processing and sharing information about the emergency so as to facilitate an informed response.

17. The Scottish Avian Influenza Stakeholder Group will help support the Scottish response, and will be joined by relevant organisations depending on the nature and extent of the outbreak.

### **Links to Local Plans**

18. The Scottish Plan links directly with the individual Local Contingency Plans that have been drawn up for each of the five Animal Health Divisional Offices in Scotland. The Local Plans are extremely important as it is at the local level that the disease would have to be fought, controlled and eradicated. The Local Plans draw on support from key agencies e.g. Local Authorities (who also have emergency plans in place) and also look to include local

stakeholders. Through these local plans the SVS links into Scotland's 8 regional emergency planning groups and the existing emergency planning infrastructure. A principal difference to other arrangements is that the lead agency in a disease outbreak would be the SVS rather than one of the 'Blue Light' emergency services.

### **Changes since the Previous Plan**

19. This contingency plan has been updated in the light of emerging evidence from the further global spread of high pathogenic avian influenza. There is now circumstantial evidence to suggest that migrating wildfowl could spread the high pathogenic avian influenza - previously it had been thought that wild birds could carry only the low pathogenic form, which when of H5 or H7 strain, could mutate into high pathogenic avian influenza. In the light of these developments the plan has been amended to expect a requirement for free range flocks to be housed were high pathogenic avian influenza to be found in the country. Where the finding is in the domestic poultry industry there would also be an expectation that a national movement ban would be introduced as a precautionary measure. All such restrictions would be lifted as soon as the epidemiological situation was known.

20. Reflecting the impact the housing of birds could have on the industry, guidance on the practical steps involved is also provided in this plan. This is set out on page 36.

21. The plan is principally about the response to the discovery of high pathogenic avian influenza in domestic poultry. It has now been extended to provide an overview of what would happen if high pathogenic avian influenza were found in wild birds in Scotland. In such a situation enhanced surveillance and biosecurity would be introduced – there would be no culling of wild birds as this is not considered an appropriate or proportionate response. This section of the plan (page 25) also sets out how an ornithological experts group would be created to help advise Scottish Ministers of the targeting of additional surveillance and other issues relating to wild birds.

22. The plan will be further updated in 2006 to take into account the new European Directive on Avian Influenza when it is transposed into domestic legislation.

### **Contact Point**

23. This Contingency Plan is subject to regular review and any comment or questions relating to its content and ongoing development should be sent to:

Animal Health and Welfare Strategy Planning and Exotics Branch  
Room 358  
Pentland House  
Robb's Loan  
Edinburgh  
EH14 1TY

e-mail: [ahwcontingencyplanning@scotland.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:ahwcontingencyplanning@scotland.gsi.gov.uk)

## SECTION 1 - DISEASE RESPONSE ASSUMPTIONS

24. This section outlines the general principles that are likely to be adopted in the event of an outbreak of HPAI or ND. These are in line with EU Directive 92/40/EEC for HPAI and 92/66/EEC for ND which form the framework for the response for all Member States of the EU. The Plan concentrates on the processes which will follow *confirmation* of disease. Confirmation of the first case will be made by the UK Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) on the basis of laboratory testing.

- Birds susceptible to HPAI or ND include domestic fowl, turkeys, geese, ducks, guinea fowl, pigeons, pheasants and partridges.
- All premises with a suspect case will be served with Form EXD1 (Annex G) restrictions, which prohibit movements off the premises.
- Where HPAI or ND cannot be ruled out and diagnostic samples are taken, Form EXD1 (Annex G) will be signed by the SVS.
- If HPAI or ND is confirmed, a Statutory Order will be signed establishing an Infected Area, which covers an area with a minimum 10 km radius surrounding the Infected Premises (IP). In EU terminology, the Infected Area will be subdivided into a Protection Zone (PZ), which is made up of an area with a 3 km radius immediately around the Infected Premises, and a Surveillance Zone (SZ), which is made up of the area falling within the remaining 7 km. See Annex A for further details.
- When HPAI is found in Great Britain (in wild birds or domestic poultry), it is expected that a national requirement for the housing of birds would be issued. This would probably last for several days but would be relaxed as soon as the epidemiological situation was understood.
- When HPAI is found in the domestic poultry industry, national movement restrictions would be introduced as a precautionary measure.

### Principles

- **Flocks on infected premises will be slaughtered.**

25. This stamping out policy is a requirement of the EU Directives. These EU rules recognise that HPAI and ND are diseases which inflict serious damage both in terms of animal welfare and to the economy of the area in which any outbreak occurs. The culling out of infected premises, together with movement controls, are the most effective ways of halting the spread of HPAI/ ND. Epidemiologically separate production units may however be exempt from culling subject to a veterinary risk assessment and subject to the maintenance of high standards of biosecurity.

- **Notification of restrictions in place will be made to all agricultural holdings within both SZ and PZ areas.**

- **Movement restrictions will be applied on poultry, eggs, manure and used bedding litter within the Infected Area. See form DP4 (S) for further details (Annex G).**
- **In an HPAI outbreak, p Poultry in the Protection Zones will, and in Surveillance Zones may, be required to be kept in their living quarters or other place where they can be isolated. For ND this will depend on the veterinary risk assessment.**
- **Captive birds (any birds kept under human control other than poultry or racing pigeons) will not be subject to specific control measures. Within an Infected Area, owners or keepers will be required to report any sickness and deaths and these will be investigated.**
- **On laboratory confirmation of an outbreak of HPAI or ND anywhere in GB, movement restrictions of poultry outside the Protection and Surveillance Zones may be introduced subject to a veterinary risk assessment. Table eggs, eggs for the food industry and poultry moving to slaughterhouses will be allowed to move under general licence subject to meeting conditions specified in the Diseases of Poultry (Scotland) Order 2003 relating to cleansing and disinfection. Hatching eggs and poultry other than for slaughter will require specific movement licences from SEERAD.**
- **Export health certificates for live poultry and hatching eggs will be withdrawn. Consignments of live birds, day old chicks and if possible poultry meat exported during the risk period would be identified and authorities in the importing country notified.**
- **Preferred culling methods will vary depending on circumstances such as the number, species and location of the birds, layout of the farm or poultry house, staff available, etc. Methods of killing that might be used are: exposure of birds to gas; percussion devices; barbiturate injection; electrical stun/kill; neck dislocation; and for day old chicks maceration**

25 A key disease control tool is the enforcement of a number of **stringent biosecurity provisions** within poultry premises to cut down the risk of disease spreading. For example thorough cleansing and then disinfection of buildings used for housing poultry, their surroundings, any vehicles on the premises used for transport of poultry and all equipment likely to be contaminated. (Annex C gives biosecurity advice for use in a disease situation, to support the existing Biosecurity Code of Practice)

<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/agri/crwl-00.asp>

- **The countryside will be kept open and a presumption in favour of access will be maintained.**

26 In the event of a disease outbreak there will be a presumption in favour of access. Annex E provides details of the access policy and guidance for farmers.

- **The existing SVS resource will be enhanced to cope with the disease.**



27 The SVS maintains a database of veterinary personnel (Local Veterinary Inspectors) who are able to respond to any disease outbreak. This includes a group of 100 LVIs with expertise not only in disease diagnosis and control but also in management of control programmes.

- **In the immediate response to a disease outbreak in Scotland, a Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC) will be established and a Regional Operations Director (ROD) will be appointed.**

28 The LDCC will be established by the local Divisional Veterinary Manager (DVM). The size of the LDCC will be adjusted according to the scale of the outbreak with the ROD providing appropriate assistance. The veterinary response will be governed by the SVS Standing Instructions. See Annex I for Guidance on Resources Required for a LDCC and Annex H for the Role of the ROD.

- **Incineration, rendering or landfill of carcasses will be the preferred hierarchy of disposal method and any decision will be made on the basis of appropriate veterinary and other professional advice.**

29 The choice of these options will take account of local circumstances and will be considered as part of local planning. The priority will be to avoid the build up of carcasses and associated risks to public and animal health and the environment. The DVM will retain discretionary authority for the way in which poultry are disposed of, particularly in the very early stages of an outbreak. In practice, the options available for disposal will depend on the scale of the outbreak. Annex F provides further information on the Executive's disposal policy and outlines different disposal options.

30 Disposal will be facilitated by the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC), which will provide logistical support. Disposal issues will be regularly reviewed by the Disease Strategy Group<sup>3</sup> (DSG) in conjunction with regulatory bodies e.g. Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA), Food Standards Agency (FSA), and other Stakeholders.

- **Emergency Vaccination will be considered alongside other disease control strategies but will not be an alternative to the culling of poultry on infected premises.**

31. EU Directives 92/40/EEC and 92/66/EEC set out clearly that the basic control strategy for HPAI or ND will be the culling of susceptible species on infected premises. If further action is required by the epidemiological situation, emergency vaccination will be considered as a potential policy option. The use of emergency vaccination is governed by the relevant disease Directive. Vaccination for Avian Influenza is not generally considered viable with current technologies. Each bird would have to be individually injected, some twice; immunity can take up to 3 weeks to develop; and vaccinated birds can still become infected and shed virus. In addition tests to differentiate vaccinated from infected birds are not yet fully developed and this will have implications for disease control and the trade status of affected Member States. Vaccination for Newcastle Disease is available and not subject to the same practical limitations and would therefore be considered. In normal circumstances,

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<sup>3</sup> Disease Strategy Group: A group established to co-ordinate and manage the Scottish disease control response. Further details available in Section 2, Command and Control Disease Management in Scotland.

some birds are already vaccinated against Newcastle Disease. Annex B gives details of the different disease control strategies available and sets out a framework for decision making.

- **Stakeholders will be fully involved from the first stages of an outbreak. They will have an important role in helping to communicate disease control and other issues to their membership, and their members views back to the Department.**

32 As sections 3 and 4 outline, stakeholders will have a key role in assisting the Scottish response to any disease outbreak. Specific stakeholder groups will be established to inform decisions on disease control and access. Annex K lists key stakeholders and other key agencies, and contact details.

- **Human health implications of an HPAI outbreak will be factored into all decisions on disease control strategy.**

33. Certain sub-types of the AI virus are capable of infecting humans, with symptoms ranging from mild eye inflammation to fatal influenza. This is most likely to occur if there is significant exposure to material containing the virus, such as poultry faeces, feathers and contaminated dust from the poultry house. This Plan therefore sets out procedures to protect the staff most at risk, and if necessary their close household contacts,` and to reduce the chance of them acting as intermediaries in the development of a pandemic. Annex D gives further details.

## SECTION 2 - COMMAND AND CONTROL DISEASE MANAGEMENT IN SCOTLAND

34. This section describes the overarching command and control systems, which will be put in place to manage any Scotland wide disease control activity. Annex L illustrates the overall management structure, which will be introduced in the event of an HPAI/ND outbreak in Scotland/GB.

### **Disease Strategy Group**

On notification of any case of HPAI/ND in GB the Scottish Minister for Environment and Rural Development will be informed and a **Disease Strategy Group** (DSG) will be created. The DSG will report to the Minister, and will meet in Pentland House, with phone and video links to the LDCC as appropriate.

#### **Role:**

To co-ordinate and manage the Scottish disease control response, taking account of local conditions, farming practices in Scotland, and other potential impacts on the Scottish economy.

#### **Membership:**

Head of SEERAD  
Head of Food and Agriculture Group  
CVO Scotland  
Chief Agricultural Officer (CAO)  
Head of the Animal Health and Welfare Division  
Representative from Scottish Executive Health Department  
Regional Operations Director (ROD) (based in the field)  
Head of SVS Operations Scotland (HOS) (based in the field)

The Group will liaise closely, as appropriate, with other interests e.g. SEERAD Environment Group, FSA, SEPA, HPS.

The HPAI/ND Strategy Unit in the Animal Health and Welfare Division will provide secretariat support.

A flow chart of key actions is attached at Annex F.

### **National Disease Control Centre (NDCC)**

On notification of an outbreak of HPAI/ND in GB the NDCC will be established and be based at the SVS London Headquarters.

#### **Role:**

The logistical support for any Scottish disease control effort will be managed from the NDCC. It will implement an agreed GB disease control framework.

#### **Membership:**

The NDCC is composed of various “cells”, each with clear operational responsibility, for certain areas. For full details, see the DEFRA Generic Contingency Plan. Liaison Officers from the Executive/ SVS in Scotland will be based at the NDCC to ensure that Scotland’s situation and Scottish policy are fully reflected in all decision making.

### **Scottish Avian Influenza Stakeholder Group**

Alongside the creation of the DSG, regular meetings will also be held with stakeholders and key agencies, at Pentland House.

#### **Role (SAISG):**

To provide a sounding board to inform policy decisions being taken.

To provide stakeholders with a mechanism for directly communicating with the Department.

#### **Role (individuals):**

To help keep their members informed.

To alert the Executive to any particular issues they may be facing.

#### **Membership:**

National Farmers Union Scotland (NFU Scotland)

Scottish Rural Property and Business Association (SRPBA)

Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA)

SAC

British Veterinary Association (BVA)

Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB)

Road Haulage Association (RHA)

Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA)

Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty of Animals (SSPCA)

Scottish Egg Producer and Retail Association (SEPREA)

Police

Aviagen Ltd

Grampian Country Chickens (Rearing Ltd)

Joseph Mitchell (Letham) Ltd

R & E Chapman

Deans Foods (Thornton) Ltd

Glenrath Farms Ltd

Initial focus: to explain the current disease position.

Each stakeholder will be limited to a maximum of two representatives per meeting (contact details are included in Annex K).

Sub-groups may be considered to address specific issues e.g. movement controls.

### **Local Disease Control Centre: Management Control Team**

Established initially by the DVM but later chaired by the ROD. This Team will meet daily or at greater or lesser frequency as determined by the disease situation.

#### **Role:**

To enable an integrated management and control response at local level to deal with disease control measures by the inclusion of key enforcement agencies of local and central Government and others.

**Responsibilities:**

Each representative will bring specific expertise and the ability to mobilise resources from their parent organisation. They will have a forum to raise issues and a means of keeping their parent organisations informed of the current situation.

**Membership:**

Regional Operations Director (ROD)  
Divisional Veterinary Manager (DVM)  
Principal Agricultural Officer (PAO)  
Local Authorities (e.g. Emergency Planning Officer and Head of Trading Standards or equivalent)  
Police  
Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA)  
Consultant in Public Health Medicine, local NHS Board  
In attendance: SE Press Officer

**Local Stakeholder Group**

Established by the ROD. Meetings will be held with local stakeholders and agencies as required.

**Role:**

To ensure that developments in local operations are communicated to all relevant parties.  
To allow input from all relevant parties to inform local decisions.

**Membership:**

To be determined locally in consultation with the ROD and the DVM, but where appropriate will include:

Police  
Department of Public Health, NHS Board  
NFU Scotland  
Scottish Rural Property and Business Association (SRPBA)  
Road Haulage                      Ramblers Association  
Disposal Industry                SAC Disease Surveillance Centre  
Local Authority                 SAC Farm and Rural Business Development Offices  
Aviagen Ltd\*                      Joseph Mitchell (Letham) Ltd\*  
Grampian Country Chickens (Rearing) Ltd\*  
R & E Chapman\*                Deans Foods (Thornton) Ltd\*  
Glenrath Farms Ltd\*            Scottish Egg Producer and Retail Association (SEPRA)

\* if appropriate to the infected area

### **Economic Impact Group**

Recognising that an outbreak of HPAI/ND can have implications for the wider rural economy, the Head of SEERAD Analytical Services Division will consider creating an Economic Impact Assessment Group. This would report to Scottish Ministers.

#### **Role:**

To inform any process of immediate hardship relief and longer term recovery.

#### **Membership:**

Scottish Executive	ERAD Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Department (ELLD) Tourism Group Local Government Finance Group
External	Enterprise Networks Visitscotland Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) Employment Service Scottish Agricultural College (SAC)

Other members would be co-opted as appropriate and links would also be established to the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise.

### **Links to other Agricultural Departments, Whitehall Departments and European Union**

Reflecting the principles outlined in the SEERAD/DEFRA/SVS Concordat, which recognises the importance of close co-ordination and communication in responding to notifiable diseases within a single epidemiological unit, the GB approach allows the development of significant specialist veterinary support from the SVS Headquarters. A policy **Liaison Officer** (Band C level) will be despatched to the NDCC on confirmation of a GB outbreak. A veterinary Liaison Officer from the SVS in Scotland may also attend the NDCC, to ensure that an agreed GB disease control framework is established. The **Head of Food and Agriculture Group**, or other senior officials, will attend appropriate Whitehall meetings.

In addition the **Scottish Executive European Union Office** will keep in contact with the EU Institutions, on the position in Scotland, in co-ordination with the UK's Permanent Representation to the EU.

## SECTION 3 – ERAD HEADQUARTERS STRUCTURES

35. This section describes how the disease control decisions will be implemented in Scotland at the national policy level and on the ground.

36. On identification of an HPAI/ND outbreak anywhere in GB, the Head of the Animal Health and Welfare Division will establish 2 units – HPAI/ND Strategy Unit and HPAI/ND Operational Unit, details of which are provided below:

### **HPAI/ND Strategy Unit**

Headed by the existing Head of the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy Planning and Exotics Branch.

#### **Role:**

To ensure that key interests inside the Executive (e.g. Environment Group, Tourism Group, Public health policy, Press Office) and outside (e.g. Scottish Parliament, FSA, SEPA, stakeholders) are kept fully informed of developments and to support the general management of disease control related policy.

#### **Responsibilities:**

##### Secretariat

- General support to the DSG and Stakeholder Group.
- Dissemination of notes of meetings/instructions.

Personnel: C1, B1

##### Communications

- Dissemination of policy to public/farmers/media.
- Quick and effective communication to those in the field.
- Departmental and Inter-departmental liaison.
- Stakeholder liaison.
- Parliamentary Statements.
- Parliamentary Questions.
- Briefing.
- Contact point for enquiries from agencies and stakeholders.
- Creation and management of a Helpline.
- Creation and management of an HPAI/ND website.
- Dealing with HPAI/ND related correspondence (Ministerial and Official).
- Handling national policy issues which develop during the response to the outbreak and its aftermath.
- Co-ordinating a response to any legal appeals against the Executive's handling of HPAI/ND (e.g. over culling powers) in conjunction with the Office of the Solicitor to the Scottish Executive (OSSE).

Personnel: C1, 2 B2, 2 B1, Press Officer

##### Access

- Policy lead on access.
- Attend Access Forum.

Personnel: C1 & B1 from Countryside and Natural Heritage, Vet support

The Unit includes a dedicated **HPAI/ ND Press Officer, Communications Co-ordinator** and an **Access Officer** seconded from SE Environment Group. These roles are described in more depth in the communication strategy.

### **HPAI/ND Operational Policy Unit**

Headed by the existing Head of the Animal Health and Welfare Policy Branch.

#### **Role:**

Managing the operational side, and in particular legislation.

#### **Responsibilities:**

##### Legislation Team

- Responsible for producing various Statutory Instruments and Secondary Legislation which need to be created to support the Executive's response.
- Supported by a dedicated Solicitor (who would also be available to other Units dealing with HPAI/ND – e.g. the strategy in responding to any Judicial Reviews) .
- A local authority enforcement/trading standards officer may be brought in as an advisor on the practical aspects of enforcing legislation.

Personnel: B3, B1, Solicitor

##### Movements Team

- Responsible for devising and implementing movement regimes.
- Works alongside Legislation Team.
- Responsible for policy in Scotland relating to poultry movements.
- Includes Agriculture Staff and veterinary input.
- Communication with SEERAD Area Offices, Agricultural Census Branch in SEERAD, Other Government Departments, stakeholders, Local Authorities, police.

Personnel: C1, 1 PAO, Senior Agricultural Officer (SAO), SEGIS, Information Systems Division, Vet support, B2, B1

##### Compensation Policy Team

- To provide a link between SEERAD and DEFRA.
- Introduce appropriate secondary legislation (in conjunction with Legislation Team).
- Responsible for policy in Scotland relating to compensation.
- Liaison with valuers.
- Co-ordinate the administration of compensation claims in Scotland. (DEFRA are responsible for compensation payments, but policy liaison and oversight will be required).

Personnel: B3, 2 B1

##### Disease Monitoring Team

- Provide support to both the rest of the Strategy Unit, and the Operations Unit, in producing up to date maps illustrating the disease situation.

Personnel: SEGIS mapping support, IS Division



**Staffing**

Core membership of Units:	provided by the Animal Health and Welfare Division
Additional technical input:	provided from Agriculture Staff and veterinary colleagues
Additional admin input:	provided from elsewhere within the Executive

37. A series of daily meetings will be scheduled to take place across the Command and Control Disease Management Structures. Team Briefing meetings form part of this schedule and are to be held at regular intervals throughout each day. Representatives from the main headquarters disease control teams, Agricultural Staff, Press Office, and CAP Management and Agricultural Policy Divisions will attend. Lasting approximately 30 minutes these meetings will provide a forum for immediate concerns / key points of information to be raised and corrective action identified.

### Schedule of Meetings

	07:30-08:00	08:00-08:30	09:30-10:00	10:00-11:30	11:30-12:00	12:00-12:30	14:00-15:00	15:30-16:00	16:15-17:15	18:00	19:00-19:30	21:00
Strategic (NDCC)	Team Brief			Emergency Direction Group		Team Brief	RODs Teleconference		Emergency Direction Group	Receive RODs Sitrep	Team Brief	NDCC Report Compiled and Circulated
Pentland House		Team Brief	DSG	11 am stakeholder Meeting (Frequency to be agreed)		Team Brief		DSG		Team Brief		
Operational (LDCC)	Team Brief	Daily Management Control Meeting				stakeholder Mtg (Freq to be agreed)  Team Brief	RODs Teleconference		Team Brief	Send SitReps to HQ/NDCC		

### **Veterinary Unit**

The expertise of the Veterinary Unit will be fundamental to the Executive's response to an HPAI/ND outbreak. Policy decisions will be based on veterinary risk assessments.

#### **Role:**

The CVO Scotland will provide veterinary advice to Ministers and Officials on HPAI/ND control in Scotland. The Veterinary Unit will provide veterinary expertise to inform all policy decisions.

### **Pentland House Agricultural Staff**

Agricultural staff have technical expertise in livestock, including poultry, farming and will be vital in informing policy decisions.

#### **Role:**

To provide advice and support to the DSG, Ministers and Strategy Unit.  
To provide the link between the Agricultural Offices and Headquarters.

Responsibility for the initial production of the Infected Area map(s) remains with Page Street, London, but in close consultation with SVS staff in Pentland House, Agricultural Staff and Animal Health and Welfare Division. There will be a requirement for Agricultural staff to produce related maps for a variety of purposes, for example, Press Office, Web page and letters to farmers. Agricultural staff will draw on the expertise of CAP Management and Drawing Office staff for mapping duties.

#### **Licences**

In an extensive outbreak, it is likely that licence to slaughter and movement licence schemes will be introduced. One of the key responsibilities of the Agricultural Staff will be facilitating these.

- All licences for use in the Protection and Surveillance Zones will be issued from the LDCC.
- For licences for use outside the PZ and SZ, the Agricultural Staff will work with the Operations Unit to draw up licences, and guidelines for how they should be used. They will also issue these licences from HQ in Pentland House.

## SECTION 4 - FIELD OPERATIONS

38. This section provides an overview of roles and responsibilities in the field. These will be subject to some variation according to local circumstances.

### **Veterinary Response**

**Role:**

The SVS will be the lead organisation in all aspects of disease control.

### **Head of Operations (Scotland) (HOS)**

**Role:**

The Head of Operations (Scotland) will be responsible for: directing the veterinary field response in support of Scottish Executive policy: liaising directly with the ROD, DVM and Management Control Team in the LDCC(s); briefing the DSG on the local disease situation

### **Regional Operations Director**

**Role:**

To support the veterinary response as led by the DVM. To co-ordinate all local agencies, to ensure the interests of Scottish Ministers are met in the execution of policy, and to form a link between the DSG and operations on the ground.

(For details of the role and responsibilities of the ROD, see Annex H).

### **Divisional Veterinary Manager (DVM)**

**Role:**

To manage the local veterinary response and more generally (in conjunction with the ROD) the entire local disease control operation.

**Responsibilities:**

- Initially call together the LDCC Management Control Team for briefing pending the arrival of the ROD.
- Identify the proposed Infected Area to inform HQ decisions.
- Plan the initial Infected Area action, including biosecurity measures, pending the arrival of the ROD.
- Establish the SVS LDCC and field teams.
- Ensure immediate valuation, slaughter and disposal on the initial infected premises pending the arrival of the ROD.
- Advise the Director (Defra) of Procurement of the need to implement procurement initiatives.

### **Local Agricultural Staff**

**Role:**

The PAO and his staff will provide professional agricultural and administrative support to the DVM and ROD.

Important role in liaising with the local farming community.

**Responsibilities:**

- Assessment of applications for, and issue of, Movement Licences.
- Manning of local Helplines.
- Preparation, issue and delivery of Forms.
- Technical duties in support of Vets at culls, e.g. organising/accompanying valuers.
- Logistical management of Infected Area operations.

### **Local Authorities**

**Role:**

- Key role in establishing the LDCC (in conjunction with the ROD and DVM).
- Liaison with the local community.
- Role in enforcing the Infected Area regime and all other disease enforcement issues.
- Responding to applications to close land (in consultation with the DVM).
- Emergency Planning support.
- Providing information on use and location of private drinking water supplies.

Local Authorities will be a core element of the disease control response and their responsibilities, particularly in terms of liaising with local communities, will be determined by matters arising at the time.

### **Police**

**Role:**

The Police have a key role in the enforcement and logistical side of various aspects of the disease control response.

**Responsibilities:**

- Enforcement of movement controls and patrolling Infected Area.
- Enforcement of access restrictions.
- Stopping vehicles transporting poultry, and checking licences.

### **SEPA**

**Role:**

Provide relevant environmental expertise and support with respect to the disease control response.

**Responsibilities:**

- Advice on siting and operation of any Cleansing and Disinfection points in the Infected Area, and the disposal of waste from infected premises e.g. used disinfectant, veterinary medicines, feedstuffs and poultry manures etc.
- Input into the animal carcass disposal policy.
- Advice on the use of authorised incinerators, rendering plant and landfill sites for carcass disposal.
- Monitoring of environmental quality and impacts of disease control policy, as appropriate.

**SE Press Officer**

A **SE Press Officer** will be located in the LDCC.

**Role:**

- Liaison with the local media.
- Co-ordination with the ROD, DVM and PAO and Head of Press HPAI/ND Team.
- Co-ordination on media issues with other agencies and stakeholders e.g. Local Authority, SEPA, Police.

## **SECTION 5 - RESPONSE TO FINDING HIGH PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN WILD BIRDS**

39. This contingency plan is principally about the response to avian influenza being found in domestic poultry. However, there is a possibility that high pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) could be carried by migrating birds and that this could be found through the ongoing programme of surveys. In such a situation the primary response would be to enhance the surveillance of domestic poultry and wildbirds in the area (to establish whether the finding was an isolated case) and encourage heightened biosecurity. Surveillance would be led by the State Veterinary Service. The general public would also be informed, particularly highlighting any public health implications of disease passing to humans and explaining that the risk of catching it comes from very close contact with infected birds, and particularly with faecal matter.

41. As noted earlier in the plan any finding of HPAI is likely to lead to an immediate requirement for the housing of poultry.

42. There will be no requirement to cull birds – domestic or wild - in proximity to the identified finding. Such steps are not considered to be a proportionate or effective disease control response. In wild birds such actions could lead to a further spread of disease by encouraging other infected birds to disperse, carrying virus with them.

43. There would be no requirement for the countryside to close, since the risk of the disease being spread by recreational access in the countryside is very small. The risk of humans catching avian influenza can be eliminated by avoiding direct contact and by taking sensible hygiene precautions. Within the provisions of the Scottish Outdoor Access Code, and following detailed advice provided at the time, land managers will receive advice on the specific disease situation implications from the State Veterinary Service and the Scottish Executive. In line with that advice land managers will be able to make local arrangements for responding to the finding. The presumption would remain that the countryside is kept open.

44. In considering the situation the Executive would be supported by an ornithological experts group, which will be convened on confirmation of disease in the UK.

### **Ornithological Experts Group – Remit**

To provide the Scottish Executive with expert ornithological advice, particularly in the terms of the format of additional surveillance and the implementation of measures to minimise disturbance to wild birds.

### **Membership**

Chaired by the Animal Health and Welfare Division it would include the Chief Ecological Adviser, the SVS, Scottish Natural Heritage, British Association for Shooting and Conservation, RSPB, Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust, British Trust for Ornithology (Scotland), Game Conservancy Trust, Scottish Agricultural Science Agency and the Scottish SPCA.

The Group would also be called upon in the event that high pathogenic avian influenza were to be identified in a flyway which includes the UK. It is expected that the Group would advise on any specific targeted surveillance that may be needed in Scotland. It would not be expected to be called upon in the event that low pathogenic avian influenza were found.



## SECTION 6 – COMMUNICATION

46. The FMD Inquiry Reports emphasised the role of communications in successful disease control. The Scottish Executive commissioned independent consultants to carry out a review of the information needs of stakeholders and the most effective methods of communicating with them. On the basis of this a Communication Strategy for use in Exotic Disease outbreak has been developed and sits alongside this plan.

47. Key features of the Communications Strategy include:

- Detailed course of action for each stage of an outbreak (suspect, confirmed, ongoing).
- Clear description of the policy position on the naming of locations.
- The issuing of a map of the infected area along with press releases.
- Definitions of roles and responsibilities with job descriptions for key players.
- Description of tools and infrastructures used to disseminate information effectively.
- A communication Matrix, identifying a wide range of audiences, the information each will require and the best channel of communication with them.

### **Internal**

48. The HPAI/ND Strategy Unit will be responsible for ensuring that Scottish policy is effectively communicated. For this reason a role has been created for a Communications Co-ordinator, who will be responsible for overseeing the effective dissemination of accurate information both internally and externally. In addition a Scottish Executive Press Officer will be sent to the Animal Health Office to co-ordinate communications at the local level. A priority will be to ensure that the staff in the field are fully aware of policy, but it will also be vital that appropriate communication is undertaken with other parts of the Scottish Executive, particularly Environment, Health, Enterprise and Tourism colleagues to ensure that the disease control work is fully joined up with any work on its wider impact.

### **Veterinary Emergency Instructions**

49. Where a specific Scottish delivery plan is developed and instructions need to be issued to veterinary field staff, this will be done through existing channels by the SVS Headquarters staff. Similarly any veterinary instructions which do not apply in Scotland will not be directly issued to Scottish field staff but will be copied to DVMs for information.

## **SECTION 7 - RESOURCES**

50. In devising this Plan the Scottish Executive has made a commitment that additional resources will be made available from elsewhere within the Executive and its Agencies to support the Environment and Rural Affairs Department in its lead Department role. The Executive is working to develop an Emergency Cadre of staff who can be identified and quickly released to help with the Executive response in any emergency situation, such as an outbreak of animal disease.

51. Part of this strategy means that staff working in an intense operational and policy area will be rotated as appropriate to ensure that they are not overburdened to the detriment of their health. This was a key element from the lessons learnt from the 2001 FMD outbreak, and reflects army policy. Further information on the welfare support role provided by the Employee Assistance Programme for permanent Executive staff and immediate family members is available on 0800 587 5670.

### **LDCCs**

52. The Scottish Executive is responsible for providing the LDCC infrastructure and locations will be identified in Local Contingency Plans.

53. The DVM will set up a LDCC when disease is confirmed. DVMs will identify and regularly review the availability of potential LDCC locations. They will also maintain information on suppliers and contractors should temporary accommodation be required and ensure access to telephone / IT equipment. The Executive will also be prepared to deploy and connect its own communications infrastructure at immediate notice. (Details on locations and capacity requirements of LDCCs are detailed in Annex I).

### **IT Infrastructure**

54. The main computer system for HPAI/ND control will be the Diseases of Poultry Control System (DP DCS). This is the Management Information System which will be used in the event of an outbreak. DVMs will ensure that all their Animal Health Office staff are familiar with the functionality of the DP DCS, requesting training from SVS IT Unit as appropriate.

### **Procurement**

55. Defra is responsible for the GB Animal Health budget for funding disease control strategy. This reflects the need for co-ordinated action within a single epidemiological unit and the ability to exploit economies of scale in procurement. As such, operational procurement will be co-ordinated with DEFRA and will take advantage of various call-off contracts which have been established as part of GB-wide contingency planning arrangements.

56. The Defra Procurement and Contracts Division (PCD) will provide a team to operate at operational level from 72 hours or sooner, in a declared emergency, to manage all of the procurement activities at a local level. These will include a Commercial Manager (Procurement), Contracts Manager, Purchasing Manager, Quantity Surveyor, Field Store Manager and Field Manager (Procurement). Forensic accountants will be engaged prior to

receipt and approval of supplier/contractor invoices and will be responsible for the certification, verification and evaluation of these invoices.

57. The ROD/ DVM will ensure that PCD have been contacted at the suspect case stage, so that the appropriate resources can be placed on standby. Sources of supply for personnel have been identified by PCD and these resources can be called upon in the event of a notifiable disease outbreak or other emergency situation. Best practice guidance is available to Animal Health Divisional Offices which will provide support until Procurement staff arrive and will include guidance covering the triggering of contingency contracts; authorisation and use of emergency purchase orders and procurement cards; and contract management and letting.

## **Contracts**

58. Defra PCD are, and will be responsible for ensuring that robust, value for money contracts are let and mobilised for goods, services and works requirements including their contract management and forensic examination. These contracts will be let on a regional and local basis, in consultation with local Animal Health Offices, to supply contingency arrangements to meet all foreseeable requirements of an emergency or notifiable disease outbreak. All Suppliers will be vetted and will be subject to regular review.

59. These contracts and arrangements will include but not be limited to slaughter and disposal, gatherers and ancillary equipment; carcass pick-up; preliminary C&D including detoxification units; management and disposal; electrical works and technical services. Details of contingency contracts will be held locally (at each Animal Health Divisional Office) and centrally (PCD).

60. A supplementary list of suppliers will be kept in Animal Health Offices as a back-up to the contingency contracts already in place, and these are likely to be engaged where a notifiable disease cannot be confined either in scale or geographically.

61. These lists include, for each AHDO, a list of transport companies indicating the number and type of vehicles that the companies have available for immediate use together with the companies' ability to scale up supply within defined timescales.

## **Procurement by the Scottish Executive**

62 Procurement of goods and services required for administrative support (including accommodation, furniture, personnel and utilities) is the responsibility of the Scottish Executive. SE Procurement Division will liaise with the ROD to ensure that these are procured in line with Scottish Executive policy. Consultation between DEFRA's PCD and Scottish Executive Procurement Division would be undertaken as necessary.

## **Serology**

63 In the event of a disease outbreak within GB, Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease diagnostic samples would go to the Veterinary Laboratories Agency, Weybridge.

## ANNEX A

### SURVEILLANCE AND PROTECTION ZONES

#### Introduction

A1 When HPAI or ND is first confirmed, measures to contain and severely limit any spread of virus either by animal or other (e.g. vehicles) means will be implemented immediately in an area not less than 10 km surrounding the Infected Premises (IP). As set out in EU Legislation the boundaries should use natural defining features, e.g. roads, rivers, railways, footpaths. The Infected Area will be expanded as necessary in response to any further cases of confirmed disease and the perimeter will always be at least 10 km from the nearest IP. Normally these disease containment measures applicable to the Protection Zone element of the Infected Area will continue until at least 21 days after preliminary Cleansing and Disinfection of the last Infected Premises in that particular area. Measures continue for at least 30 days in the Surveillance Zone element. See Annex B for further details on disease control measures.

#### Local Management and Co-ordination

A2 Successful management of HPAI/ND controls depends on the co-operation of all the agencies involved. To achieve this co-operation, a LDCC Management Control Team will be set up immediately when HPAI/ND is confirmed. It will comprise the DVM, ROD, PAO, Local Authorities (LAs), Police, and SEPA. Others, such as the fire brigade, may be co-opted for specific projects as the need arises. Normally this group will meet in the LDCC twice a day in the initial phase and will themselves determine the required frequency thereafter. Where more than one Local Authority or police force is involved all will be expected to participate.

A3 In consultation with the LDCC Management Control Team, the ROD will set up a local stakeholders group, specifically to address Infected Area issues. Membership could include industry representatives, the Community Council, as well as some local individuals with business or other interests which might not be represented otherwise (e.g. forestry, fish farms, tourism, schools, church). The stakeholder group would meet as frequently as desired in the early phase of an outbreak and then possibly weekly, but this would be determined in light of the circumstances.

#### Division of Responsibilities

A4 The key partners in the operation of an Infected Area are:

- **SEERAD** Pentland House will ensure the legislative base and, with the NDCC, produce the formal maps defining the Infected Area and update this in response to the developing circumstances. Through the LDCC, the ROD will arrange for the notification of all public utilities, feed companies and others who may regularly visit poultry premises and farms in the area and for a press release for public information. Local radio will also be used where possible. Through the LDCC all licence issues will be undertaken. The ROD will, on the advice of the DVM, liaise with poultry keepers to arrange for disinfectant teams to be placed at the entrances to all poultry premises; for the setting up of mobile C&D Units, and for disinfectant points,

including footbaths, to be sited at the entrances to all other poultry premises. He/she will enlist the help of the Local Authority in setting up and manning these teams.

- The **State Veterinary Service** will provide advice and guidance to the other agencies when and where required. The SVS will provide and train personnel, and quality assure the biosecurity operations in the Infected Area.
- Considerable **Local Authority and Roads Department** input will be required in identifying all exit points from the Infected Area. Local Authorities will also have a role in informing those in the area, e.g. Community Councils, schools, etc., and in monitoring and enforcing the legislative requirements.
- The **Police** have a key role in traffic flow and in patrolling within the Infected Area to ensure compliance and checking for licences where appropriate.
- **NFU Scotland, Scottish Egg Producer and Retail Association (SEPRI), the British Egg Industry Council (BEIC) and British Poultry Council (BPC)** will have a major role in helping to communicate information to the industry.

## Resources

A5 Local Authorities would also be responsible for all enforcement issues and required to participate in the LDCC Management Control Team and to consider what other local issues would need to be addressed e.g. local publicity/liaison, helpline etc.

A6 Depending on the size of the Infected Area, the police should normally expect to have at least one patrol car operating within the Area to give visibility to the operation and to challenge any poultry related/agricultural vehicle moving without a licence. In addition, a senior officer should participate in the LDCC Management Control Team.

A7 SEPA should have at least one officer involved in the HPAI/ND operations providing advice on all aspects, including Infected Area operations, through the LDCC Management Control Team.

## **ANNEX B**

### **DISEASE CONTROL OPTIONS**

B1 The strategy in controlling an outbreak of Avian Influenza or Newcastle Disease would, as is required by the relevant EU Directives, be to slaughter all susceptible birds on Infected Premises. Contact premises deemed by veterinary investigation to be of high risk would also be slaughtered out, as “Dangerous Contacts”. This strategy would be supported by strict biosecurity and movement restrictions. Other measures would be considered if the epidemiological information indicated a need to go further.

#### **Emergency Vaccination**

B2 A Ministerial decision to use Avian Influenza or Newcastle Disease vaccination would be based primarily on epidemiological and veterinary advice. As explained in the section dealing with Disease Response Assumptions, it is unlikely that the current vaccines would in practice be used to control an outbreak of HPAI. However, vaccines for Newcastle Disease do not suffer from the disadvantages of the HPAI vaccines and are therefore a more practical proposition in disease control terms in supporting the basic slaughter strategy. Indeed, large parts of the industry already vaccinate on a prophylactic basis.

#### **Extended Culling Strategies**

B3 As with vaccination, the use and design of an extended cull would be based on veterinary and epidemiological judgment. Given the present nature and distribution of the poultry industry in Scotland, and the likely role of wild birds as disease vectors, it is unlikely that an extended cull strategy would be considered an effective disease control option.

## ANNEX C(i)

### BIOSECURITY ADVICE FOR ALL POULTRY KEEPERS

**It is recognised that the major organisations within the Poultry industry have made significant progress towards achieving and maintaining consistently high standards of biosecurity. The number of large extensive free range units in Scotland necessitates a heightened awareness towards maintaining high standards of biosecurity. The following guidance is intended to raise the general awareness towards biosecurity for ALL keepers of poultry.**

In the event of an outbreak of HPAI or ND anywhere in Great Britain, the following information will be widely distributed by the Scottish Executive as well as being displayed on the Executive's website. The Executive published in 2002 a generic Biosecurity Code detailing measures to be taken as a matter of routine to guard against HPAI or ND. For details of this, as well as advice for use during an outbreak, see the Biosecurity website, which will be regularly updated.

<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/about/eradra/lah/00015721/biosecurity.aspx>.

**IF YOU SUSPECT THAT YOUR FLOCK(S) HAS AVIAN INFLUENZA OR NEWCASTLE DISEASE, ISOLATE AND STOP ALL MOVEMENT OF POULTRY, HATCHING EGGS EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL. CONTACT YOUR LOCAL ANIMAL HEALTH OFFICE IMMEDIATELY:**

**Ayr**           Tel: 01292 268525

**Galashiels**   Tel: 01896 758806

**Perth**         Tel: 01738 602211

**Inverurie**    Tel: 01467 626300

**Inverness**    Tel: 01463 253098

<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/about/ERADRA/LAH/00015721/AHOMAP.aspx>

#### **Key Information**

Newcastle Disease is a highly contagious disease caused by a para-myxo virus.

Avian influenza is a highly contagious viral disease affecting the respiratory, digestive and/or nervous systems.

Birds affected by these diseases include fowls, turkeys, geese, ducks, pheasants, guinea fowl and other wild and captive birds including ratites such as ostriches, emus and rhea.

Disease can be spread by:

- Movement of poultry, people, vehicles and equipment between and within poultry premises

- Introduction of birds of low or unknown health status
- Contact with neighbours' flocks
- Using shared farm equipment and vehicles which have not been effectively cleansed and disinfected
- Contact with vermin and wild birds
- Birds drinking from contaminated water sources
- Birds eating contaminated feed
- Unsatisfactory cleaning and disinfection of vehicles, sheds, feeding troughs and other equipment.

### **Clinical signs**

Quickly recognising clinical signs of HPAI or ND in affected birds is vital to controlling the disease and preventing it from spreading.

#### Avian Influenza

Typically, clinical signs often present suddenly.

Look out for these signs:

- High mortality, often approaching 100%
- Oedema of the head
- Cyanosis of the comb and wattles
- Dullness
- Lack of appetite
- Respiratory distress
- Diarrhoea
- Reduction in egg production.

Birds may often die without any signs of disease being apparent. There can also be considerable variation in the clinical picture and severity of the disease.

#### Newcastle Disease

Clinical signs can be very variable. The disease can be present in a very acute form with sudden onset and high mortality or as a mild disease with respiratory distress or a drop in egg production as the only detectable clinical signs.

Look out for these signs:

- Depression
- Lack of appetite
- Respiratory distress with beak gaping
- Coughing
- Sneezing
- Snicking
- Gurgling and rattling
- Yellowish green diarrhoea and nervous signs

In laying flocks a sudden drop in egg production with a high proportion of eggs laid with abnormal (soft) shells is often an early sign of disease. Young birds are particularly



susceptible and mortality can be heavy, with survivors often exhibiting permanent nervous signs.

### **Stopping the spread of poultry diseases**

Stringent biosecurity measures can help to avoid disease occurring or spreading to other poultry, birds or animals. It is important to apply the biosecurity precautions that suit your premises.

### **Look for early signs of disease**

Be vigilant for any signs of disease. If you suspect Avian Influenza or Newcastle Disease contact your local Animal Health Division Office immediately. Isolate and stop all movement of poultry and hatching eggs.

### **Keep flocks separate**

- Keep new incoming birds isolated from the rest of the established flock. Discuss with your vet and agree a testing and monitoring programme.
- Use separate equipment and staff or handle isolated birds last.
- Keep isolation buildings as near as possible to the farm entrance and separate from other poultry buildings. Ensure buildings are in good repair and actively prevent vermin from getting in and spreading any disease.

### **Clean and then disinfect**

- Only disinfectants approved by Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department (SEERAD) should be used. Further details are available from <http://www.hms.gov.uk/legislation/Scotland/ssi2003/20030334.htm> Specified dilution rates and label recommendations must be strictly adhered to. Further advice is available from the local Animal Health Office.
- Clean and then disinfect all vehicles after each journey. If possible, do not use the same vehicles for transporting birds, feed, manure or other wastes.
- Regularly clean and then disinfect all crates, containers and other equipment before and after use. Do not move any equipment into different poultry buildings without cleaning and then disinfecting it first. This also applies to injecting and dosing equipment.
- At depopulation at the end of a cycle, thoroughly clean the building and all equipment, including ducting, drains and fans. Remove all surplus feed, dead birds and litter. Disinfect the premises and all equipment and carry out rodent and other pest control. Cleaning equipment and protective clothing should also be cleaned and then disinfected.
- All vehicles and trailers must be cleaned and then disinfected before entering and leaving poultry premises. Firstly, use water to wash off all mud before applying disinfectant. If the vehicle is dirty, disinfectant will not kill the virus. Ensure that hard to reach areas, for example, the wheels and wheel arches are properly cleaned.
- Make sure the inside of the vehicle is cleaned as well, including the foot wells, pedals and mats. Clean all areas used for carrying other things such as feed, bedding or equipment.

### **Keep yourself clean**

- Don't bring infection onto your farm, or spread it around your farm, on your clothes, footwear or hands. Clean overalls and footwear must be worn when entering poultry premises. After handling birds all protective clothing and footwear should be removed and either cleansed and disinfected, laundered or disposed of. Wash hands with soap and water.
- If all your poultry are at one location, keep a set of clothing or overalls to wear when working with them. If your poultry are at several locations, keep separate clothing/overalls for each group.
- Remove any mud or dung from footwear before applying approved disinfectant. Ensure that disinfectant footbaths are kept clean and that disinfectant is changed regularly. Keep footbaths covered so that rain does not dilute the disinfectant.

### **Keep your farm secure**

- Provide cleaning and disinfectant materials (brush, hose, water, disinfectant and, if possible a pressure washer) for all business visitors/workers on arrival and departure and have protective clothing/footwear/disposable gloves available for on-farm use.
- Display notices directing callers to the farmhouse or office first.
- Strictly limit and control access to poultry flocks. If possible the site should be fenced with a controlled entry point.
- Keep farm access routes, parking areas, yards, areas around buildings and storage areas clean and tidy and well maintained.
- Minimise contact between poultry and wild birds. Prevent accumulation of standing water and remove spilled feed that could attract wild birds. Maintain buildings to ensure that wild birds do not nest or roost in them.
- Keep wild birds, dogs, cats, rodents or other livestock out of poultry buildings and feed stores.
- Be vigilant for evidence of vermin. Have an active rodent and pest control system in place.
- Supply only clean fresh drinking water to birds. Water lines and drinkers must be flushed through and cleaned regularly. In the case of free-range birds restrict access to possible sources of standing water used by wild birds.
- Feed bins, hoppers and feeding equipment must be cleaned and maintained regularly. Feed silos and containers must be sealed to prevent animals and wild birds contaminating feed.
- Damaged eggs, dead birds, litter and manure may carry disease. Dispose of them promptly and properly.

### **Keep unnecessary vehicles away**

- Visitors and their vehicles should be limited and as far as possible kept away from poultry buildings and pastures.
- Encourage visitors to park at a safe point outside the poultry premises' entrance. Have a disinfecting point at the poultry premises' entrance/exit points for visitors to disinfect footwear and equipment. If a vehicle has to come onto your poultry premises the vehicle must be thoroughly cleaned and then disinfected and, if possible, parked away from poultry buildings.

### **Avoid visiting other farms/poultry premises**

- Follow cleaning and disinfecting advice when visiting other poultry premises. Business visitors and contractors should follow all these precautions.
- No clothing or footwear that has been in contact with poultry on one farm should be worn within another farm's poultry premises. If you can, wear boots and clothing supplied. Your dog could be carrying infective material on its fur or feet, so it is best left at home.

**IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS, CONTACT YOUR LOCAL ANIMAL HEALTH OFFICE. AN ON-CALL 24-HOUR SERVICE IS PROVIDED FOR EMERGENCIES.**

## ANNEX C(ii)

### SEPARATING FLOCKS FROM WILD BIRDS

**One of the main ways in which the disease can be spread is by contact between infected wild birds and domestic poultry. That is why, if the disease is found in this country, you may be required by law to house your birds indoors or otherwise isolate them from wild birds. This is for the protection of your own flock and others.**

If housing is not fully practicable, you will be required to take all reasonable steps to minimise contact between your birds and wild birds. You must also ensure that your birds do not have any contact with poultry or captive birds on other holdings.

These are important disease control requirements. In the event of an outbreak, if you cannot meet them, you may have to reduce stock numbers through culling.

This leaflet therefore helps you find practical ways to meet your legal obligations. You should read it if you keep poultry for commercial or hobby purposes; if you keep ducks or geese; if you keep other captive birds including raptors, and if you are involved in rearing game birds.

**Please bear in mind that failure to comply with disease control requirements could lead the relevant enforcement authority to bring action against you.**

#### **Protecting your birds**

As a keeper of birds, you are responsible for their welfare both now and during an outbreak. The Government has already asked keepers of birds to feed and water birds indoors and to remain vigilant for disease risks.

#### **What does the law require?**

If there is an outbreak of an avian notifiable disease, all birds within at least 3km of the infected holding are **immediately** required to be housed or otherwise kept separate from wild birds while the outbreak is brought under control. The requirement could remain in force for **several weeks**.

Even if you are not in the vicinity of an outbreak, the Government may issue a temporary nationwide legal order for birds to be housed indoors as far as is practicable if Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) is found. It might also do so as a preventive measure if there is a significant risk of an outbreak. The order will be issued to prevent spread of the disease while the source of the virus is identified and immediate action is taken to control the outbreak.

*A requirement to keep your birds separate from wild birds will also apply to free range and organic producers. Under current legislation – except for free-range egg producers – this may mean that your produce cannot be marketed as free-range or organic. However, the UK Government and industry representatives are seeking a rapid resolution of this issue at EU level and will keep you informed of progress.*

## **Ways to protect your birds**

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza can be spread through faecal droppings from infected birds. Control of the disease depends on minimising contact between potentially infected wild birds and managed birds. Housing your birds indoors is the best way to achieve this. For most keepers, a little prior planning should make it easier to comply with the housing requirement.

If you are unable to house all your birds indoors, the aim should be to minimise the chance of wild birds landing close to your birds, mingling with them and contaminating their water and feed supply.

### **Housing**

The first and best option is to house your birds and all practicable steps should be taken to ensure that this happens. If your birds are normally housed indoors this should not present major problems.

Keep your birds inside their existing houses. Ensure that any openings are netted to prevent wild birds gaining access. 25 mm aperture net is recommended to keep out small birds.

If your birds have access outside you will have to plan alternative housing. There are different housing options which can be considered including:

Making use of existing buildings (such as barns, sheds, outbuildings) adapted for your birds.

Ensure that any openings are netted to prevent wild birds gaining access.

Erecting a lean-to veranda on the side of existing houses.

Erecting a new temporary structure to house birds. This may be a building with solid walls and roof or a polytunnel. A polytunnel will be suitable only in cooler weather.

If after considering these options they do not prove to be practical, other steps you should take include:

Erecting a net structure/shade house and ensuring that the netting used is of a suitable size to keep out small birds; 25 mm aperture is recommended.

Constructing temporary outdoor pens using straw bales and a tarpaulin roof with bird-proof netted gaps for light and ventilation.

If bad weather is likely to be a problem it may be necessary to erect a windbreak around your bird-proof structure.

We recommend that you refer to commercial suppliers of anti-bird netting for advice and further information on equipment.

### **Feeding and watering indoors**

There are certain species of bird - such as ostrich, captive wildfowl or geese which are not normally housed during day or night - for which even the minimum housing steps outlined above may not be practicable. The very minimum action you should take is to isolate their food and water from wild birds. Availability of feed and water will attract wild birds; by only

feeding and watering your birds inside, the possibility of mingling is reduced. The steps you can take include:

Provide extra protection to feed and water stations to avoid attracting wild birds.  
Rotate feeding times. Many wild birds learn when captive birds are fed and congregate at these times.

Prevent your birds from accessing open water that may be contaminated. Ensure that your birds receive only mains or treated water.

Install bird-scarer systems to scare off wild birds. Types of scarer include auditory and visual scarers and deterrents. Most auditory scarers are designed to scare away all birds so may not be suitable for nervous birds and should be used with care.

### **Additional Deterrents**

In all cases you should also consider making use of wild bird deterrents such as flutter tape, flashing lights, scarecrows and auditory scarers.

Agricultural bird scarers are not suitable for domestic circumstances and must always be used responsibly, within the relevant legal controls.

When designing any housing structure, if posts are necessary, think about incorporating spike strips to deter perching.

### **Pheasants, partridges and other game birds**

Birds should be housed whenever possible and as a minimum all feeding should take place under cover. However, where game birds are being raised for release it may be that these measures cannot be properly put in place. Bird scarer systems may need to be adopted. If the disease risk is high, careful consideration may have to be given to culling birds. Specialist advice is available from representative organisations and the State Veterinary Service.

### **Geese**

Where small numbers of birds are kept it should be possible to house them in the event of a disease outbreak. Temporary netted structures, feeding and watering under cover and using wild bird deterrents will reduce their mingling with wild birds, and can cover large areas. Where large numbers of birds are kept it may not be possible to bring them all indoors and you should consider all of the alternative methods described in this leaflet.

### **Pinioned captive wildfowl**

Where possible birds should be housed and as a minimum all feeding and watering should take place under cover. Separation of your birds from wild birds by netting their enclosures and the sensible use of deterrents will reduce their mingling with wild birds. You should consider moving your birds away from large bodies of water that attract similar species of wild birds.

### **Backyard flocks**

In addition to the measures described in this leaflet, give careful consideration to alternative measures to prevent your birds from mingling with wild birds. For example, if you keep your birds in a domestic location consider if alternative housing is available to them nearby. Suitable options may include a garden building, a garage or existing redundant buildings that could be adapted to house your birds temporarily.

## **Welfare**

Housing for a sustained period birds that are not used to being housed may create welfare and behavioural problems. You should be vigilant for e.g. feather pecking and cannibalism.

Overcrowding may become a problem and you must take steps to ensure that the stocking density within each house will not reach the point at which bird welfare is compromised – a particular risk in hot weather or cold wet weather.

For chickens and turkeys being reared for consumption, you should consider reducing their growth rate to prevent over-crowding. However you should seek expert advice before doing so as these measures may themselves cause welfare problems.

You should provide fresh litter in all temporary accommodation and ensure adequate feed and water, ventilation and lighting is available. You should give consideration to some form of environmental enrichment, such as the use of straw bales.

Always ensure that your birds have clean water - do not use standing water that may have become contaminated by wild birds.

To ensure you pick up problems before they lead to deterioration of bird welfare you should increase supervision by stockmen, for example by increasing their number or the frequency of inspections.

## **Will I need planning permission to erect a structure?**

Planning permission is not always required if the work does not involve building, engineering or similar operations. Permitted Development Rights exist for erecting structures in certain circumstances. Simple structures such as posts and netting might not require permission. It is unlikely, for example, that you would need planning permission if the structure is temporary, mobile, or used for the purposes of agriculture.

However, regulations will differ between commercial and hobby poultry keepers. It is always advisable in the first instance to check with your local council who will be able to direct you or go to [www.planningportal.gov.uk](http://www.planningportal.gov.uk) for contact details.

## **Help and Advice**

Effective biosecurity is a primary concern even before any instruction to house birds is issued. Visit [www.defra.gov.uk](http://www.defra.gov.uk) for general biosecurity advice and to order further copies of this leaflet; alternatively call the Helpline on **08459 335577**.

Look out for signs of disease in your flock. Increased mortality, falling egg production and respiratory distress may be early signs of a disease problem. If you suspect disease, ask your vet for advice as soon as possible. Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease are notifiable diseases. You must tell the Divisional Veterinary Manager (DVM) at the local Animal Health Divisional Office if you suspect these diseases.

Further guidance on planning is available in appendix B to 'A Farmers Guide to the Planning System'. This Guide is available on the ODPM web site under 'Planning, Planning Guidance and Advice' at: [www.odpm.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1144475](http://www.odpm.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1144475).

Information is also available on the following sites:

[www.countryside.wales.gov.uk](http://www.countryside.wales.gov.uk)

[www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Agriculture/animal-welfare/Diseases/SpecificDisease/AvianInfluenza/AIIntroduction](http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Agriculture/animal-welfare/Diseases/SpecificDisease/AvianInfluenza/AIIntroduction)

[www.dardni.gov.uk](http://www.dardni.gov.uk)



## **ANNEX D**

### **HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF AN OUTBREAK OF AVIAN INFLUENZA OR NEWCASTLE DISEASE**

#### **Guiding principles**

**D1** There are few or no human health or safety implications of Newcastle Disease. This Annex will concentrate on the health and safety aspects of staff dealing with an outbreak of HPAI and with the wider public health aspects which could arise from it.

**D2** The State Veterinary Service is responsible for the management and eradication of disease in the event of an outbreak of AI, whether low pathogenic or high pathogenic in nature. However many of the operations carried out in an outbreak will involve other staff, who may be employees of poultry companies or contractors. Exposure to infected birds may be particularly intense during catching, culling and disposal operations and it is important that these are managed with a view to protecting the health of staff. There are two main concerns to be addressed:

- (a) protection of the health of individual workers by reducing exposure to material contaminated by the virus and ensuring access to appropriate preventive medication
- (b) protection of public health by reducing the likelihood of genetic reassortment of the virus which could occur if a worker is simultaneously exposed to both human and avian influenza. This would involve protecting the individual both from infection with Avian Influenza and immunising them against human influenza.

**D3** Overall responsibility for protecting public health in the event of an avian influenza outbreak in Scotland rests with the NHS Boards. Because of the potential risk to public health (due to concurrent infection with human influenza and the risk of genetic re-assortment and the creation of a pandemic strain of the virus), the local NHS Board will define a local outbreak of avian influenza among poultry as an incident presenting actual or potential harm to the public health and establish an Incident Control Team (ICT) chaired by the Consultant in Public Health Medicine (communicable disease and environmental health) (CPHM(CDEH)). This team will coordinate aspects to protect human and public health, linking with the Divisional Veterinary Manager and Local Authority. Practical aspects of preventive actions such as ensuring arrangements are in place for the administration of antiviral drugs and influenza vaccine will be coordinated by the CPHM (CDEH) via the ICT. Health Protection Scotland (HPS) is producing guidelines for NHS Boards on the actions to be taken in the event of such an incident. Detailed arrangements, however, are likely to vary from area to area based on local circumstances.

#### **SVS Staff and Contractors**

**D4** The SVS retains its responsibilities as employer under Health and Safety legislation to protect employees and contractors against infection with Avian Influenza virus, and it is expected that this will involve use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) of a design and specification suitable for the tasks undertaken, as well as other personal protective measures such as antiviral therapy. The responsibilities of the SVS (and its Occupational Health

Provider) will link with the actions identified as necessary by the NHS Board ICT, based on HPS guidelines, to ensure that there is coordination across the whole system.

D5 The remainder of this Annex details the advice to SVS veterinary and technical staff on the risks to human health from avian influenza (AI) in poultry, the guidance on wearing personal protective equipment (PPE) and to outline the recent developments in the provision of antiviral drugs and human flu vaccine to staff engaged in on-farm disease control activities. The guidance is equally applicable to low pathogenic (LPAI) and highly pathogenic (HPAI) strains of AI.

### **Risk of transmission**

D6 Transmission of avian influenza viruses to people remains relatively rare and is associated with direct contact with infected poultry or other birds or their faeces. Faecal material can contaminate dust, soil, water, feed, equipment and clothing and feathers. Transmission to people only occurs with certain strains of avian influenza. Symptoms of avian flu in people range from mild conjunctivitis to typical flu-like illness, which can lead to acute respiratory illness, viral pneumonia and can be fatal. Infection with avian influenza virus A/H5N1 has been characterised by sudden onset with cough and high fever. There is currently no vaccine for the prevention of avian flu in people, though one is being developed. There is however good evidence that avian flu viruses respond to antiviral drugs, and in the UK oseltamivir (Tamiflu®), or other appropriate antiviral agent would be used for the treatment and prevention of avian flu in people.

D7. Avian influenza has two significant implications for human health:

- the severity of illness that may follow infection with avian flu virus; and
- the potential for adaptation of the avian influenza virus A into a strain, that both causes severe disease in humans and spreads easily from person to person, or its transformation, through exchange of genes with a human flu virus, into a novel virus capable of spreading easily between people and causing severe illness on a pandemic scale.

D8. Public health control measures in any outbreak of avian influenza in poultry in this country will therefore aim to protect people against avian influenza and also protect against the risk of genetic re-assortment of the virus. Poultry workers who have not received seasonal flu vaccinations would be offered it as a protection against the possibility of re-assortment with human flu virus. Antiviral therapy, as appropriate, to protect against the development of avian flu will be given to those who may be exposed to the infection through close contact with infected birds.

D9. Anyone in contact with diseased birds must follow the precautions detailed in the relevant risk assessments (SVS staff should refer to guidance in VIPER chapter 46 and chapter 4). Because of the possible different strains and varying infectivity of each strain of avian influenza virus to people, a precautionary approach should be taken. Anyone with medical conditions that may increase the risk of infection with avian influenza, such as respiratory disease or a reduced immuno-competence will be advised to stay away from poultry farms, avoid all contact with infected birds and seek appropriate medical advice.

D10. All SVS staff and contractors who have had, or are likely to have contact with infected birds will be provided with information as to how to protect themselves and their families from infection. To protect against infection, a hierarchy of control measures are needed which include:

- safe working practice in accordance with the risk assessment
- the wearing of all appropriate personal protective equipment by poultry workers/handlers/cullers/veterinarians;
- safe disposal of used personal protective clothing and equipment;
- use of the antiviral oseltamivir (Tamiflu®) or other appropriate antiviral agent for the prescribed period by all who are considered to be at risk of infection and for whom antiviral therapy is not contraindicated;
- vaccination with seasonal flu vaccine of all those considered to be at risk of infection and for whom vaccine is not contraindicated;
- monitoring of health status of persons exposed to infected birds; and
- guidance to those at risk of infection on the personal hygiene measures to be taken to protect their health and to prevent the spread of infection.

### **Safe Working Practices & Personal Protective Equipment**

D11 SVS staff should refer to the detailed guidance in Appendix A12 of VIPER chapter 46. It contains information and advice to SVS staff that may be involved in dealing with an infectious disease of poultry and details the precautions they should take to avoid zoonotic infection. It deals with the risk from respiratory and non-respiratory zoonotic infections of poultry. The measures described will reduce the risk of infection from both groups of agents. In addition, physical and chemical hazards may also be encountered whilst working on poultry premises. Details of the relevant Risk and COSHH Assessments on the SVS web site: [http://intranet/svsweb/wsdd/h-s/risk\\_assess.asp](http://intranet/svsweb/wsdd/h-s/risk_assess.asp)

D12 Each premises will be different so the initial veterinary inquiry should include an assessment of the risk, based on the information above. Depending on the level of risk, some or all of the measures listed below may be required.

a) Limiting exposure by using methods of inspection, sampling, valuation, slaughter and disposal which minimise the exposure to potentially contaminated environments, infected birds and materials.

b) High standards of personal hygiene will help prevent ingestion and inhalation of infective material and reduce the risk of transmission to others. Thorough washing with soap and water is an effective method of decontamination and may usefully be enhanced by the use of anti-viral hand wash / wipes following effective washing. Further information is in Section H of Chapter 46.

c) If exposure to a contaminated environment is necessary, PPE must be worn, even though under health and safety legislation, the use of PPE would normally be considered as a last resort. To reduce the respiratory risks from the agents involved, suitable and appropriate Respiratory Protective Equipment (RPE) and eye protection must be worn.

D13. Experience from Holland in their outbreak in 2003 is that the failure to use PPE in accordance with best practice or the failure to wear it at all, was the main reason for the incidences of direct infection in front line workers and close contacts. All SVS staff and people employed as contractors who are considered to be at significant risk of exposure must, as a minimum, use PPE / RPE as follows:

#### Respiratory protection / Eye protection

- Disposable FFP 3 face piece respirator, with exhalation valve in conjunction with close fitting goggles; or
- Other equipment which gives similar levels of protection includes; half-mask reusable respirators fitted with a P3 filter in conjunction with close fitting goggles, full-face reusable respirator fitted with a P3 filter.
- PPE must be in working order and fit correctly. Training will be provided in the fitting, use and maintenance of RPE. Where a good seal cannot be achieved with other respirators e.g. because of facial hair, a full hood powered respirator should be considered.
- If goggles are worn they must be good quality, comply with EN standards and be of the anti-mist type to allow prolonged periods of use.

#### Hand protection

- As a minimum, the disposable surgical type rubber/vinyl gloves should be worn. Where available, toughened, tear resistant brands are preferred. Because of the possibility of sensitization latex gloves must not be provided or used.
- Lightweight cut resistant, e.g. ‘Kevlar’ gloves worn under industrial weight rubber gloves, e.g. ‘Marigold’ is a good combination for handling birds.

#### Whole body protection

- Lightweight disposable overalls with hoods– e.g. ‘Tyvec (style 1431N) Pro Tech or similar should be worn to prevent contamination of personal clothing.
- Wellington boots – those normally issued to SVS staff will do in most circumstances.
- Mob cap or hair net.

D14. PPE must be of good quality, properly maintained and issued individually. Where appropriate, a range of sizes should be available. The ‘one size fits all’ principle is not an option, badly fitting PPE is at best, inconvenient and at worst, ineffective and potentially dangerous. Note: Current advice is that all-in-one suits (often described as SARS suits) are not required as long as the PPE/RPE described above is fitted and used according to best practice. This policy is however under constant review.

#### Medical Intervention & Prophylaxis

D15. Individuals with existing respiratory infections should not be exposed to the risk of contracting Avian Influenza and will be deployed on low risk activities. Individuals who have asthma should not work in dusty or other situations that may aggravate their condition and should take medical advice if they are unsure about what work they can do. Staff must

seek early medical attention if they experience symptoms of infection and report to their line manager any illness they suspect of being work related.

### Vaccination

D16. As noted earlier those working with poultry will be offered seasonal flu vaccine as a further protection against the possibility of re-assortment with human flu virus. Vaccine will be given as soon as possible, either before or at time of exposure., and at least within 48 hours of initial exposure. There is no evidence to suggest that the administration of human flu vaccine predisposes an individual to infection with avian influenza. The vaccine will be delivered and administered to by clinical staff, coordinated by the local NHS Board outbreak control team chaired by the CPHM (CDEH). Actions will be based on the guidelines produced by Health Protection Scotland (HPS) taking local health service circumstances into account.

D17. Antiviral therapy will be given as soon as possible, either before or at the time of exposure, and is effective as long as it is administered within 48 hours of initial exposure. The choice of antiviral therapy will be based on the medical advice at the time of the outbreak. The agreement is that stocks will be drawn from the Scottish Executive Health Department (SEHD) emergency stocks. Current advice is that oseltamivir (Tamiflu®) is the likely product of choice. Arrangements for administration of antivirals may again vary from location to location but the NHS Board outbreak team and the CPHM (CDEH) will maintain an overview of the arrangements in place.

D18. These products are prescription only medicines and can only be prescribed by suitably qualified medical practitioners. Oseltamivir should be prescribed with caution in persons with renal impairment, or who are pregnant or breast feeding. In such cases, or in cases of doubt, staff are advised to consult their General Practitioner and to inform their line manger (in-confidence) of any potential issues or concerns that may prevent them from taking these products. Staff unable to take antiviral therapy will not be expected to undertake on-farm disease control duties on infected, potentially infected premises or other high-risk premises. It may be necessary for veterinary and technical staff to stop on-farm duties for a period of time between courses of antiviral therapy. The length of the course and the lay-off period will depend on the product used and medical advice at the time. Staff will be assigned to office duties or non-poultry work during any such lay-off period.

D19. Persons not employed by the SVS or SEERAD will be advised to seek health and safety guidance from their employer's Health and Safety adviser or medical practitioner. The local outbreak control team will take an overview of the arrangements in place for such persons and for close family contacts considered to be at risk to ensure that both their personal health is protected and any risk to the public health is avoided. Advice is also available from the Health and Safety Executive on their website: <http://www.hse.gov.uk/>

## **ANNEX E**

### **ACCESS**

#### **Guidance on Risk**

E1 The only people who risk spreading HPAI or ND are those who have contact with poultry or their manure/litter. Risks of disease being spread by those seeking recreational access to the countryside are very small, and can be eliminated by avoiding direct contact between people and/or vehicles and flocks including those birds within free range farms. Official signage must be followed at all times. Under these circumstances there is generally no requirement to restrict access even in the Protection and Surveillance Zones (also known as the Infected Area).

#### **Responsibility**

E2. Implementation of access policy on the ground will be the responsibility of the Local Authorities. They will have the power to sanction closures of land outwith the Infected Area but only after approval by Scottish Ministers. Local Authority websites should contain details of all official closures in their area. All closures must be specific and time limited and notified to Scottish Ministers. Local Authorities should ensure that a balanced and consistent approach is being taken. The Executive and Local Authority websites will also be supported by information in the local and national press. Furthermore, teletext and ceefax could be another source for obtaining access information.

#### **Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003**

E3 Part 1 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 establishes rights of responsible access to land and inland water for recreation, passage and other purposes. The emphasis of Part 1 of the Act is on the local management of access. A duty is placed on local authorities to assert, protect and keep open and free from obstruction any route or means by which access rights are exercised. In the event of an outbreak of a disease such as HPAI or ND however, these powers can be over-riden, within the Infected Area, by HPAI or ND related legislation. Local Authorities, in conjunction with local access forums, will continue to have a role in resolving local issues with veterinary advice being provided when necessary. If, however, landowners prevent or deter access rights by putting up signs in areas outwith the Infected Area, local authorities can serve notices on landowners to remove signs or if necessary they can remove the signs.

E4 The Scottish Outdoor Access Code approved by the Scottish Parliament provides guidance on the rights and responsibilities of access. Sections 3.32 and 3.33 provide specific guidance on biosecurity and any disease outbreaks.

#### **Origin of visitors**

E5 Walkers or ramblers pose a very low risk of spreading HPAI or ND; the only people who carry any real risk of spreading HPAI or ND are those from infected poultry premises or poultry premises that are incubating disease. People who pass close to the Infected Area on roads are unlikely to pick up the virus. Poultry farmers should ensure that all visitors are

following biosecurity guidance to ensure that disease is not brought on or taken off their farm or land.

## ANNEX F(i)

### DISPOSAL

#### Disposal Policy

F1 This Annex sets out disposal policy and how this disposal will be carried out in Scotland. Stringent controls are required on the cleansing and disinfection of any vehicles and personnel involved in disposal. (see annex C for detailed guidance)

#### Hierarchy

F2 Disposal will be allocated according to a hierarchy of preference, which takes account of environmental and public health considerations of the options:

- Commercial Incineration
- Rendering
- Permitted Landfill

Each Animal Health Office will consider the availability of appropriate areas in their territory where disposal sites may be found, as part of their local contingency planning arrangements.

#### Allocation across GB

F3 Disposal will be considered strategically on a GB basis, and material will be allocated to disposal plants taking into account the situation across GB. There is therefore flexibility to make sure that GB can successfully dispose of all its waste material in the most appropriate place. Within the agreed framework, Scottish material will take priority in Scottish disposal facilities. These arrangements will ensure that the best use is made of the available resource.

F4 The NDCC will co-ordinate disposal logistics, and the ROD will liaise with the NDCC to agree the use of facilities.

#### Key Roles

F5 Disposal policy will be determined centrally by the **DSG** (inviting Environment Group and SEHD to the group to attend meetings as appropriate). Disposal of carcasses will be prioritised by the **DVM**, and in the first instance of disease, for speed, the DVM will activate the disposal mechanisms. Once in place, the **ROD** will co-ordinate disposal activity, liaising as appropriate with the NDCC. Health and Safety issues arising from disposal operations will be handled via the mechanisms detailed in Annex D.

#### Contracts

F6 Incineration: agreement in principle has been obtained with nine large animal incinerator operators in England, Scotland and Wales. Contingent arrangements are in place and will be reviewed on a regular basis.

F7 Rendering: a call-off agreement with a major rendering company has been arranged. Additional capacity will be arranged in the event of a major outbreak. Biosecurity protocols are being agreed with rendering companies.



F8 Landfill: structured agreements and national operational protocols are being developed in conjunction with permitted landfill sites. Powers of Direction may have to be used in an emergency situation. SEPA will be consulted about the use of landfill capacity.

### **Records**

F9 The ROD will ensure that systems are in place to accurately record relevant details of animals culled and disposal data. Disposal statistics for each LDCC will be entered into DP DCS and/or SCOTS and will form part of the Daily SITREP sent by the ROD to the DSG and the NDCC.

### **Transport**

F10 Transport will be procured locally and tasked by a transport manager located in the LDCC or at the Scottish SVS HQ. Transport considerations will be co-ordinated at the national level, and the ROD will link into these transport operations as required.

## **ANNEX F(ii)**

### **HIERARCHY OF PREFERRED DISPOSAL OPTIONS**

#### **1. INCINERATION**

- Upon confirmation of first case the DVM should contact the Rural Payments Agency (RPA) and they will organise and advise on disposal options. The DVM will be responsible for managing and organising the transport provision for the first 48 hours, until the NDCC disposal manager and the national and regional transport managers are appointed. For subsequent cases, the DVM should then contact 24-hour transport line and order vehicles to transport carcasses to agreed incineration or rendering disposal outlet. Incineration capacity is limited and will therefore need to be supplemented by rendering and other forms of disposal.

#### **2. RENDERING**


- As for incineration.

#### **3. LANDFILL**

- Ministers have powers to direct waste to landfill, however it would be preferable to agree in advance capacities with Landfill operators. This issue will be clarified in the GB protocol which is currently being drawn up in agreement with the Environmental Services Association (ESA), Environment Agency (EA), SEPA, DEFRA, SEERAD and the Welsh Assembly Government.

## ANNEX G

### KEY EVENT/ACTION FLOW CHART



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graph TD; A[ ] --> B[Stage 3]; B --> C[Stage 4]; C --> D[Stage 5 – Ongoing Disease Control and Recovery];
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### Stage 3

- Advise via press and stakeholders strict adherence to Biosecurity Code of Practice. Issue additional information on biosecurity to farmers, support industry and contractors directly affected.
- Establish Management structure under DSG as per contingency plan:
  - Strategy Unit
  - Operations Unit
  - Access Group
  - Economic Impact Assessment Group
- Alert Personnel and Emergency planning unit to potential need to activate Emergency Cadre of staff.
- Establish Stakeholder groups

### Stage 4

- Strategy group to establish communications channels and systems as per contingency plan, appoint Disposals Co-ordinator and consider timing of Ministerial Statement to Parliament.
- Compensation Team to establish links with local Animal Health Office and DEFRA and get systems in place for processing of claims and valuation/compensation policy, all as per contingency plan.
- Operations unit to liaise with stakeholder group, Vets and Agriculture Staff and put in place Licence to Slaughter Scheme and Movement licensing system as per contingency plan.
- Access group to liaise with Access forum to issue guidance to stakeholders and press on access and risk assessment – as per contingency plan.
- Economic Impact Assessment Group to advise Ministers on scale and nature of implications.
- DSG to consider:
  - Disposal policy
  - Zoning
  - Ongoing objectives for disease control and recovery and serological testing to support them

### Stage 5 – Ongoing Disease Control and Recovery

- DSG Continue to manage ongoing Disease policy and eradication with supporting management structure. As disease in decline need to consider strategy for return to normal business and recovery of export markets.

## **ANNEX H**

### **FORMS**

SVS, VIPER, Chapter 4 – Diseases of Poultry can be accessed at the following link: <http://defraweb.defra.gsi.gov.uk/animalh/Viper/poultry/index.htm>

DP 4 (S) Notice to be served on occupier or person in charge of a premises where disease is suspected to exist or to have existed.

DP 5 (S) Notice to be served on occupier or person in charge of a premises where disease is confirmed.

DP 17 Notice to farmers in Protection Zone

DP 18 Notice to farmers in Surveillance Zone

## ANNEX I

### ROLE OF REGIONAL OPERATIONS DIRECTOR (ROD)

I1 A ROD will be appointed whose principal role will be co-ordination of all local agencies and input into the Disease Strategy Group. The ROD will manage all non-veterinary aspects of the LDCC. The ROD will work alongside the local DVM and will report to the DSG.

I2 A ROD will be pre-identified and deployed immediately HPAI/ND is suspected. The precise deployment will be sensitive to the circumstances at the time.

#### **Role:**

- To protect the interests of Scottish Ministers in the execution of policy and decisions taken by the DSG.
- To provide the link between the DSG and operations on the ground, and to ensure decisions taken by the DSG are implemented on the ground.
- To establish the LDCC and ensure that all non-veterinary assistance required by the DVM is provided.

#### **Responsibilities:**

- Establish LDCC: ensure suitable accommodation, communication infrastructure, and personnel in place. (In liaison with DVM and Local Authority).
- Allocation of non-veterinary staff to all necessary functions.
- Administrative support to DVM and oversee the following areas:
  - disease control measures (e.g. Infected Area)
  - cleansing and disinfection (logistics)
  - valuation of stock and other items for which compensation may be paid
  - disposal programme (logistics including transport and routes)
  - slaughter or vaccination (logistics)
  - personnel issues
  - financial arrangements
  - general procurement of resources
  - information technology
  - communications.
- Liaison with local Stakeholders, Local Authorities, Police and contractors.
- General trouble shooting.
- Media liaison.
- Visits: ensuring that DSG is made aware in advance of visits of dignitaries etc, and managing such visits
- Liaise with core disposal stakeholders to consider issues surrounding using burning and burial as disposal options.  
Includes: SE Environment Group, SE Health Department, SE Lawyers, SEPA, Local Authority, FSA, Vets, Hauliers, Emergency Planning.
- In addition, ensure that SEPA is consulted about environmental impacts of e.g. C&D burial.
- Ensure systems in place to capture financial data in relation to culling and disposal.

- To meet at least once a year with the local DVMs.

I3 The ROD will establish the local **LDCC Management Control Team** comprising all relevant local regulating bodies that will meet on a daily basis. (See Section 2).

I4 He will also establish a **local Stakeholders group**. (See Section 2).

I5 If there is more than one outbreak in Scotland, each LDCC will have a ROD assigned to it. One of the RODs will be appointed as ROD Scotland.

#### **Additional ROD Scotland Responsibilities:**

- Establish links with local RODs - set up systems to share information and identify pinch points/share best practice/provide support.
- Provide input into DSG relating to operational policy, feed policy decisions out to RODs (ROD Scotland will be the ROD representative on the DSG).
- Liaise with NDCC Disposal team as and when required to maximise efficiency of disposal.
- Negotiate in Scotland or liaise with NDCC Procurement Cell to ensure access to Renderers/incinerators/landfill sites/haulers in line with GB contracts and agree capacities/day and cost.

In the event of a single centre outbreak, the ROD automatically takes on the ROD Scotland responsibilities.

#### **Timing**

I6 The ROD has responsibility for ensuring that decisions taken by the DSG are put into effect, working as necessary with SVS personnel, agricultural staff, Local Authorities, regulators, contractors, local Community representatives and other relevant Stakeholders. The ROD will ensure that suitable accommodation and communication infrastructure is in place quickly, which is why it is important for him to be deployed as soon as there is suspicion of a disease outbreak.

I7 The relationship between the DVM and the ROD is critical to the success of the handling of an outbreak. It is for the ROD to ensure that the DVM receives whatever administrative support is required and to establish appropriate disposal routes for slaughtered animals, taking into account DSG policy on disposal options.

#### **Day 1 Tasks**

- Travel to Animal Health Office closest to outbreak
- Establish LDCC Management Control Team to review critical roles and functions, including Infected Area arrangements (for membership see Section 2)
- Mobilise transport contractor from approved list
- Ensure sufficient slaughter teams and other personnel and equipment to meet slaughter targets
- Investigate disposal routes
- Establish contact with NDCC

- Establish contact with Scottish Executive Press Office
- Assess what supporting resources will be required
- Report to DSG outlining Day 2 priorities.

I8 It is likely that the ROD will very quickly require support following his initial deployment. At the very minimum, within a matter of days of taking up the position, it is likely he will require the support of:

1 Deputy ROD (at C1 level)  
 1 Finance Manager  
 Press Desk support  
 1 Personnel Manager (depending on size of LDCC)  
 Assorted Administrative support (2 B2, 2 A3, 2 A1)

I9 The provision of suitable accommodation and IT support should already be in hand through Local Contingency Plans. However, it is important for the ROD to ensure that he is satisfied with those arrangements once on the ground. An important aspect of the ROD support structure is the need to capture information that will be needed following the outbreak.

I10. If and when military involvement commences, the ROD will liaise with the army commander to ensure that Army personnel are appropriately used and that there is mutual agreement as to what will be expected of them.

### **Other Scottish Executive Services**

I11 The ROD will want to ensure that he organises instant access to relevant specialist skills within the Scottish Executive. These include Personnel, IT, Finance and accountancy services, statistical support, Estates Services, Purchasing and Contracts, Quantity Surveyors, Waste Management Engineers, Registry expertise, etc. These should be called upon as necessary when dealing with the consequences and problems of eliminating the disease.

### **Communications**

I12 There are wider communications issues that the ROD is required to address. Communication to DSG and NDCC, Ministers, MPs and MSPs, and to the media, the local community and its representatives (Councillors and Community Councillors), members of the public, and others who express interest or concern about the operations.

### **Visits**

I13 The ROD/deputy ROD will be expected to arrange and accommodate visits by national politicians and others.



## ANNEX J

### RESOURCES FOR LOCAL DISEASE CONTROL CENTRE

J1 This Annex outlines what needs to be considered when identifying a LDCC location and what resources are required to make it operational.

J2 Location of a LDCC will be determined by a number of factors including:

- Location of the outbreak and potential for spread
- Availability of accommodation
- Road network to and from location
- Car parking
- Main services (particularly power and telephone line capacity).

J3 The requirements set out below will also have a bearing on where the LDCC is established. All these factors will be considered by the DVMs in conjunction with other local agencies. Initially it may be decided to establish the LDCC at the Animal Health Office. It must be recognised that given that the size of the 5 Scottish Animal Health Divisions there can be no certainty that a LDCC will be located in the same Council area as the outbreak.

J4 Capacity requirements:

- Main LDCC floor – open plan
- Briefing room
- Individual meeting rooms, media briefing rooms, and offices
- Laboratory facilities and secure sample handling room
- Facility to clean, disinfect and dry protective clothing
- Storage for chemicals and other stores with direct access to loading/unloading area
- Secure storage for medicines
- Stationery store and registry
- File server/communications room
- Canteen and rest area; toilets and showers
- Perimeter fence or boundary wall for site security
- Biosecurity points at building entries and vehicle wash in car park
- Showers
- Car parking

J5 Staffing requirements:

Tackling an outbreak of HPAI/ND would require staff from a number of different disciplines. Staff from the following areas would be required for a major outbreak, with numbers dependent on circumstances of the outbreak and procedures employed.

- Staff drawn from SVS resources and Temporary Veterinary Inspectors (TVI).
- S/Animal Health Officer (AHO) – again drawn from SVS resources.

- Field and office staff for Infected Area enforcement - based on staff enforcing movement restrictions on all roads into Infected Area.
- Administrative staff – including existing Animal Health Office staff, to be drawn from Executive resources.
- Procurement staff – drawn from Defra PCD sources of supply, supported by a small administrative team.

J6 Significant staff resources are required at the beginning of an outbreak, with a tendency towards over rather than under staffing. The resources can then be built up or wound down as the outbreak develops or subsides.

J7 Communication requirements:

- PCs and printers
- Internal cabling
- Sufficient telephone lines
- Prodigious power supply
- File server(s)
- GIS machines, software and plotters (number dependent on size of outbreak).

J8 Facilities management requirements:

- Site security
- Canteen operation (including very early/late operations)
- Laundry service
- Building maintenance and cleaning.

**ANNEX K(i)**

**AGENDA TEMPLATE**

**DSG Initial Meeting**

1. Modus Operandi
2. Disease Situation
3. Immediate Deployment
4. Statutory Orders
5. Communication / Stakeholders
6. Public Health
7. Resources
8. Follow up Arrangements
9. Involvement of Minister

**ANNEX K(ii)**

**AGENDA TEMPLATE**

**DSG Standard Meeting**

1. Action Points of [date] DSG meeting
2. Disease Update
3. Immediate Actions

## **Annex L**

### **KEY CONTACTS**

#### **Divisional Veterinary Managers, Animal Health Offices and Agricultural Area Offices**

##### **Ayr**

DVM: Graeme Cochrane

PAO/Officer in charge: Alan Fraser

Russell House  
King Street  
Ayr KA8 0BE  
Tel: 01292 268525

PAO/Officer in charge: Quintin Donald

161 Brooms Rd  
Dumfries  
DG1 3ES

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##### **Galashiels**

DVM: Sheilagh Brown

PAO/Officer in charge: Gregor Caldwell

Cotgreen Road  
Tweedbank  
Galashiels TD1 3SG  
Tel: 01896 758806

PAO/Officer in charge: Allan Young

Cadzow Court  
3 Wellhall Road  
Hamilton ML3 9BG

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##### **Perth**

DVM: Norman Winter

PAO/Officer in charge: Duncan MacRae

Strathearn House  
Broxden Business Park  
Lamberkine Drive  
Perth  
PH1 1RZ  
Tel: 01738 602 211

PAO/Officer in charge: Bill Dundas

Cameron House  
Albany Street  
Oban  
PA34 4AE

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Inverness

DVM: Charlie Moir

PAO/Officer in charge: Anne Rae

Longman House  
28 Longman Road  
Inverness IV1 1SF  
Tel: 01463 234141

PAO/Officer in charge: David MacVicar

Estates Office  
Portree  
Isle of Skye  
IV51 9DH

PAO/Officer in charge: Murdo MacKenzie

Ord Croft  
Lairg  
Sutherland  
IV27 4AZ

PAO/Officer in charge: Graham Cooke

10 Keith Street  
Stornoway  
Isle of Lewis  
HS1 2QG

PAO/Officer in charge: Ken Wilson

Balivanich  
Isle of Benbecula  
HS7 5LA

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Inverurie

DVM: Paddy Grant

PAO/Officer in charge: Mike Parker

Thainstone Court  
Inverurie  
AB51 5YA  
Tel: 01467 626300

PAO/Officer in charge: Frank McDougall

32 Reidhaven Street  
Elgin  
IV30 1QH

PAO/Officer in charge: Alan Younie

Tankerness Lane  
Kirkwall  
Orkney  
KW15 1AQ

PAO/Officer in charge: George Petrie

Charlotte House

Commercial Road  
Lerwick  
Shetland  
ZE1 0HZ

PAO/Officer in charge: Stewart Johnston


Strathbeg House  
Clarence Street  
Thurso KW14 7JS

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ANNEX M

ORGANISATION CHARTS


CHART 1






## CHART 2

### CONTINGENCY PLAN STRUCTURE : DETAIL OF ANIMAL HEALTH DIVISION MAIN UNITS




**CHART 3**



ANNEX N

POULTRY STOCKING DENSITY IN SCOTLAND



## ANNEX O

### USEFUL WEBSITES

Contingency Plans

<http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/diseases/pdf/avind-contplan.pdf>

<http://www.countryside.wales.gov.uk/fe/master.asp?n1=1&n2=101&n3=258>

Health Protection Agency, UK

[http://www.hpa.org.uk/infections/topics\\_az/influenza/seasonal/flufaq.htm](http://www.hpa.org.uk/infections/topics_az/influenza/seasonal/flufaq.htm)

International Organisation of Epizootics

[http://www.oie.int/eng/en\\_index.htm](http://www.oie.int/eng/en_index.htm)

Biosecurity Website

<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/about/eradra/lah/00015721/biosecurity.aspx>

Biosecurity Code

<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/agri/crwl-00.asp>

SVS, VIPER, Chapter 4 – Diseases of Poultry

<http://defraweb.defra.gsi.gov.uk/animalh/Viper/poultry/index.htm>

Employee Assistance Programme

<http://intranet/content/departments/cs/hr/teams/caws/eap/default.asp>

World Health Organisation

<http://www.who.int/en/>

Food and Agriculture Organisation

<http://www.fao.org/ag/>

European Union

[http://europa.eu.int/pol/agr/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/pol/agr/index_en.htm)

## ANNEX P

### GLOSSARY

AHDO	Animal Health Divisional Office
AHO	Animal Health Officer
BEIC	British Egg Industry Council
BPC	British Poultry Council
BVA	British Veterinary Association
CAO	Chief Agricultural Officer
CAPM	Common Agricultural Policy Management
C&D	Cleansing and Disinfection
COSLA	Convention of Scottish Local Authorities
CVO	Chief Veterinary Officer
DP DCS	Diseases of Poultry Disease Control System
DSG	Disease Strategy Group
DVM	Divisional Veterinary Manager
DEFRA	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (UK)
EA	Environment Agency
ETLLD	Enterprise, Transport and Life Long Learning Department
ESA	Environmental Services Association
EU	European Union
FMD	Foot and Mouth Disease
FSA	Food Standards Agency
HPS	Health Protection Scotland
HVS	Head of Veterinary Services (SVS)
IAAS	Institute of Auctioneers and Appraisers Scotland
IP	Infected Premises
IS	Information Systems
HPAI	High Pathogenic Avian Influenza
LDCC	Local Disease Control Centre
LVI	Local Veterinary Inspector
MSP	Member of Scottish Parliament
ND	Newcastle Disease
NDCC	National Disease Control Centre (London)
OSSE	Office of the Solicitor to the Scottish Executive
PAO	Principle Agricultural Officer
PCD	Procurement and Contracts Division (DEFRA)
RHA	Road Hauliers Association
ROD	Regional Operations Director
RPA	Rural Payments Agency
RSPB	Royal Society for the Protection of Birds
SAC	Scottish Agricultural College
SAO	Senior Agricultural Officer
SCOTS	The Executive's IT system
SE	Scottish Executive
SEERAD	Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department
SEGIS	Scottish Executive Geographical Information System
SEHD	Scottish Executive Health Department
SEPA	Scottish Environment Protection Agency

SEPRA	Scottish Egg Producer and Retail Association
SI	Statutory Instrument
SITREP	Situation Report
SRPBA	Scottish Rural Property & Business Association
SSPCA	Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
SVS	State Veterinary Service
TVI	Temporary Veterinary Inspector
VIPER	SVS Veterinary Instructions, Procedures and Emergency Routines

### **Forms**

DP4 (S)	Notice to be served on occupier or person in charge of a premises where disease is suspected to exist or to have existed.
DP 5 (S)	Notice to be served on occupier or person in charge of a premises where disease is confirmed.
DP 17	Notice to farmers in a Protection Zone.
DP18	Notice to farmers in a Surveillance Zone.